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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRIAN JORGENSEN d.b.a. MEDICINE
MAN PHARMACY and MEDICINE MAN
PHARMACY, INC., and Idaho corporation,
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)
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)
)
)
)

Respondents,
vs.
C. MICHAEL COPPEDGE and KAREN
COPPEDGE, individually and as the last
Board of Directors and shareholders of
Acology Prescription Compounding, Inc, and
A COLOGY PRESCRIPTION
COMPOUNDING, INC. a dissolved Idaho
corporation,

)
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)
Appellants
_____________
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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Bonner

Honorable Jolm T. Mitchell, presiding

Charles R. Dean, Jr. ISB# 5763
Dean&Kolts
1110 West Park Place, Suite 212
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
(208) 664-7794/(208) 664-9844 FAX

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 667-0683/(208) 664-1684 FAX

Attorneys for Appellants

Attorneys for Respondents
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INTRODUCTION

Respondents (collectively "plaintiffs") present arguments in their Response Brief that are
either not supported by law or are inconsistent with the actual record of what took place in the
trial court. Plaintiffs also completely ignore the fact that had they were the ones who convinced
the trial court to deny the Coppedges challenge to the restrictive covenant at issue and that no
trial would have taken place on either their complaint or the Coppedges counterclaim had they
not advocated what this Court found to be an inaccurate legal position.
ARGUMENT

A.

The Coppedges Are Entitled To Fees As A Matter of Right.

Plaintiffs' recitation of the law relating to the Coppedges' entitlement to an award of
attorneys' fees is incomplete. Plaintiffs cite cases like Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24 (2003)
and Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc, 118 Idaho 108 (1990) for the obvious and uncontroverted
propositions that a trial court can, in the proper exercise of its discretion, find that neither party
prevailed or, under proper circumstances, that each party prevailed in part.
A trial court does not, however, have unbridled discretion to simply deny a party fees
because it believes doing so is the fair thing to do. As supported in the Coppedges Opening
Brief, once the trial court decides that the case is one in which the award of fees is authorized
and makes the discretionary determination under IRCP 54(d)(l )(B) that a party prevailed for the
purposes of the award of costs, that party is entitled to an award of fees in an amount the trial
court believes is reasonable after weighing the factors outlines in IRCP 54(e)(3).
Here, the trial court unequivocally concluded that the Coppedges were entitled to recover
their costs "as a matter of right" (LTr 18, L 4; LR 78). The Coppedges were thus entitled to an
analysis of their fees request under IRCP 54(e)(3). The trial court, however, refused to do so,
stating instead that it had the discretion to deny fees altogether. Though the trial court recited
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRJEF-1

that it was doing so, at least in part, based upon the assertion neither party prevailed (one wholly
inconsistent with its award of costs), the record is clear that the trial court was impermissibly
imposing its own sense of justice instead of following the law.
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding Neither Party Prevailed.

The trial court made the inconsistent finding that the Coppedges were the prevailing
parties for the purposes of costs but that neither party prevailed for the purpose of fees. Aside
from that error, the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had consistently found
neither party prevailed.
Plaintiffs curiously cite the case of Shore v. Peterson, 2009-ID-0306.117, a case decided
after the Coppedges brief was filed, in support of their arguments. The holding in that case,
however, fully supports the fact that the Coppedges were the prevailing parties, virtually as a
matter of Jaw. In Shore, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction
to an action on a promissory note. In the alternative, the defendant asked in a counterclaim for
damages as a result of the alleged conversion of the tools and equipment he identified as the
consideration for the accord and satisfaction. The trial court accepted defendant's affirmative
defense and therefore ruled that his obligations under the note had been satisfied. That decision
rendered the counterclaim moot and the trial court accordingly ruled in favor of the plaintiff on
the defendant's conversion cause of action. The trial court then denied the defendant costs and
attorney's fees on the theory that neither party prevailed.
This Court reversed, holding that the defendant in Shore was the prevailing party and that
the trial court thus abused its discretion. In so finding, this Court noted (a) that the defendant had
prevailed on the "primary issue" in the case (i.e. the claim on the promissory note) and (b) that
the counterclaim was simply an "alternative" to the defendant's defense of accord and
satisfaction (Id. at I 6).
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What occurred in this case is virtually identical. Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to
recover monetary damages based on the contract this Court addressed in its prior decision. That
claim was the "primary issue" in the case since clearly the Coppedges (who lived in Florida) had
washed their hands of the Plaintiffs. The Copp edges principal defense to that claim was the
covenant as advocated by plaintiffs was a disguised, unenforceable covenant not to compete. In
the "alternative", the Coppedges asserted by way of counterclaim that the plaintiffs were in
breach of a reciprocal covenant not to compete.
The only difference between the Shore case and the Coppedges is that the trial court did
not rule in the Coppedges favor on their principal defense. Had it done so, the case would have
been over. No dispute exists as to the fact that the Coppedges had paid every penny arguably
due under the contract as of the date they closed operations in Coeur d'Alene and, as this Court
has already noted in its previous decision, the Coppedges defense applied to their counterclaim.
A ruling in the Coppedges favor by the trial court on their defense would thus mean that any
claim they had against plaintiffs based on their breach of the reciprocal covenant was similarly
unenforceable. The result would accordingly have the same effect as the trial court's favorable
ruling in Shore.
C.

The Coppedges Cannot Be Blamed Or Punished For Not Presenting Their
Defense In A Pre-Trial Motion.

Plaintiffs convinced the trial court that the Coppedges should be blamed and thus
punished for not bringing the issue of the enforceability the covenant they were advocating
before the Court in a motion for summary judgment on the speculative claim that the trial court
might have ruled otherwise than it did. Aside from fruitlessness of doing so until plaintiffs
conceded no franchise relationship existed, plaintiffs lose sight of what really happened.
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If they did not appreciate the issue on their own (something they had many years to do
given the early settlement efforts of the parties), the Coppedges' arguments and supporting
authorities were presented to them in the Coppedges trial brief a week before trial. Plaintiffs not
only had that week to analyze the issue, but was given several additional days after the trial
began by the trial court to submit written opposition. They did so, arguing strenuously against
the Coppedges defense. The trial court, with written briefing from both sides and argument from
counsel, then took several additional days to rule against the Coppedges. In doing so, the trial
court did not even recognize the contractual provision at issue as a covenant not to compete.
Instead, it accepted the plaintiffs' argument that the covenant was simply a payment term for the
consideration the Coppedges were supposedly receiving under the contract.
Arguing, as the plaintiffs did, that the Coppedges were at fault and thus should be denied
their fees when plaintiffs themselves had more than sufficient time to analyze the issue and
acknowledge to the trial court the correctness of the Coppedges position is perplexing at best.
That the trial court accepted and applied that argument to deprive the Coppedges of fees is,
however, reversible. Otherwise, every litigant who does not bring up legal issues before the trial
court in a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment ( even if denial was certain
because factual issues existed) would run the risk of being denied the award oflegal fees if trial
court then fails to analyze the law correctly. Not one case in the jurisprudence of this state
begins to support such a notion.
A.

The Coppedges Are Entitled At The Very Least To Their Post-Trial Fees.

The Coppedges' counterclaim and the timing of their arguments about the enforceability
of the covenant plaintiffs were seeking to enforce had nothing to do with what occurred after the
verdict was rendered. Over the conrse of the next year and a half, plaintiffs aggressively pursued
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two new trial motions, sought to be awarded attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest and, after
securing an order for a new trial, argued strenuously that the jury's verdict of liability should be
recognized and the new trial should be on the issue of damages only (i.e. that they should get a
second bite because their first, overreaching tactic at trial had backfired) (R 221-364). Not once
during the numerous court appearances or the numerous, multi-page briefs was any aspect of the
Coppedges' counterclaim addressed, pursued, argued or involved.
The entire time they were pursuing those efforts to reargue damages without having to
face the Coppedges' defense again, plaintiffs had the ability (and the responsibility) to reassess
the validity and enforceability of the position they were advocating. They did not do that and
that failure caused the Coppedges thousands of dollars in additional fees that under no
conceivable theory had any relationship to the issues the pursued in their counterclaim. The trial
court nevertheless refused to even consider apportioning fees between those incurred pre-verdict
and those incurred afterwards in pure defense of plaintiffs' pursuit of damages.

Dated: April 10, 2009

Dean &

olts

Charles R. Dean, Jr.
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